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ABSTRACT 
In the automotive industry, the Safety Function-FMEA according to ISO 26262 and its application to 
functional safety relevant systems is a well-established process in the form of Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels (ASILs). These represent the failure mitigation that must be applied to ensure an 
acceptable residual risk of malfunctioning behaviour. The DIN EN ISO 13849 (ISO 13849) already 
describes a process to reduce risks for machines which starts with a Hazard And Risk Analysis (HARA) 
as described in DIN EN ISO 12100 and concludes with the Safety Requirements Specification (SRS). 
The SRS is a functional and technical safety concept defining requirements and guidelines to make 
sure the design conforms to defined safety goals. ISO 13849 lists important faults and failures for 
various technologies. The defined Safety Functions (SFs) can be classified in corresponding categories 
that lead to the particular hardware/system structure. This applies to mechatronic systems consisting of 
at least one sensor, one control unit and one actuator to monitor the system and effect a response in 
case of failure. Compared to the methods described in ISO 13849, the Safety Function-FMEA allows 
systematic identification of additional failures resulting from combinations of effects, rather than only 
listing the main failure causes. Based on the complexity of the machines it is highly recommended to 
perform a Safety Function-FMEA as a complementary method to assess and improve the overall safety 
of machinery. 
Keywords: Mobile hydraulic machine, DIN EN ISO 13849, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, 
FMEA, Safety Function-FMEA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The standard ISO 13849 [1] [2] provides safety 
requirements of machinery for the design and 
integration of Safety-Related Parts of Control 
Systems (SRP/CS), e.g. in the hydraulic boom 
system for a loader crane. Amongst other issues, 
it provides general principles of design and 
validation. One of the main topics is to generate 
safety standards for machinery. 
According to ISO 13849, a separate FMEA is 
proposed or recommended for quantification 
purposes for each of these described four steps: 
Risk assessment according to 
DIN EN ISO 12100 [3] 
Identification of preventive measures that are 
converted in the form of SFs 
Determine the required Performance Level 
(PLr) 
Selection of the categories 
The first step in the FMEA process is the risk 
assessment according to DIN EN ISO 12100 
(ISO 12100), followed by the identification of the 
Performance Level (PL) according to ISO 13849 
[1] [2]. Once completed, the first step outlines the 
hazards involved in the design, the process of risk 
analysis and risk evaluation and the strategy for 
risk reduction. 
The second step details the identification of 
preventive measures that are converted in the 
form of SFs, according to ISO 13849. The SF is 
defined in this unction of the 
machine whose failure can result in an immediate 
increase of the risk(s  [4]. As an example, types 
of SFs for a hydraulic loader crane are: 
Avoiding unexpected start-up movements 
Emergency Stop function 
Safety-related stop function  initiated by a 
safeguard, e.g. Overturning Protection
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Figure 1 shows the Overturning Protection as an 
example. To avoid the loader crane from tipping 
over, the overturning torque (T) must be less than 
the counter torque for stability realized through 
the stabilizers, shown in equation (1): 
(1) 
Figure 1: Detailed example for the calculation 
Overturning Protection [5] 
The third step is to determine the PLr by selecting 
the level of requirements for each SF. 
ISO 13849 [1] provides a risk graph for the 
elementary determination of the appropriate PLr, 
which includes: 
Severity of injury (S), 
Frequency and/or exposure to hazard (F) 
Possibility of avoiding hazard or limiting 
harm (P) 
The defined risk parameters lead directly to the 
PLr and represent the level of risk. The higher the 
PLr, the higher the fault resistance of the control 
system has to be designed. 
Next, the categories are selected. Depending 
on the category selection, the influence on the 
design of the SRP/CS becomes apparent; for the 
relationship between the categories and the PL, 
see Figure 2. Each category shows typical 
hardware architectures of the SRP/CS and a 
corresponding assignment is required for each 
defined SF. The quantification is using the Mean 
Time to Dangerous Failure (MTTFd) values, the 
Diagnostic Coverage (DC) values, and the 
Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour (PFHd) 
values for the PL. These are integrated into the 
Category table according to ISO 13849 [1] see 
Figure 2, to realize the classification of the 
categories. The MTTFd values give a statistical 
probability of the failure of a specific component, 
e.g. a main control valve section, thus rating the 
reliability of the SFs. The DC defines the 
effectiveness of diagnostics, being the ratio 
between the rate of dangerous failures or total 
dangerous failures. All these parameters in total 
define the PL. The design architecture for each 
SF of the SRP/CS, for each Category is shown in 
Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
The structure of the architecture for 
Category B and Category 1 corresponds to a 
single-channel system (not redundant), as shown 
in Figure 3, with input, logic  processing and 
output. With Category B PL b is the maximum 
achievable performance level, see Figure 2. In 
Category B the minimum standard shall be 
designed, constructed, selected, assembled, and 
combined in accordance to fulfil the basic safety 
principles for the specific application. Category 1 
shall be designed and built to use well-tried 
components and well-tried safety principles, 
according to ISO 13849 [1]. 
Figure 2: Relationship between categories and PL according ISO 13849 [1] [2]
Relationship between categories and PL
Performance Level c
PFHd: 1,7 * 10
-6 [h-1]
Performance Level d
PFHd: 2,9 10
-7 [h-1]
Performance Level e
PFHd: 4,7 * 10
-8 [h-1]
Performance Level a
PFHd: 2 * 10
-5 [h-1]
Category B Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Diagnostic coverage None           None          Low        Medium        Low         Medium       High
Key:
PFHd = Probability of a dangerous 
Failure per (operation) Hour
I = Input; L= Logic; O = Output; 
TE = Test equipment; 
OTE = Test equipment output
MTTFd = Mean Time To dangerous 
Failure
DC = Diagnostic coverage
DC range
None = DC < 60%
Low = 60%
Medium = 90%
MTTFd value
MTTFd Low = 3 years to 10 years
MTTFd Medium = 10 years - 30 years
MTTFd High = 30 years to 100 years
MTTFd Low
MTTFd Medium         
MTTFd High
Performance Level b
PFHd: 5 * 10
-6 [h-1]
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Figure 3: Designated architecture for Category B and 
Category 1 according to ISO 13849 [1]
Therefore, Category 1 requires that the customer 
can request a component which is well-tried and 
state of the art. Appling the standards guides 
manufacturers on how to confirm the 
achievement of well-tried components. The 
Category 1, supports PL b to c. In Category 2, the 
occurrence of a failure can result in the loss of the 
SFs, see Figure 4. As well as in Category B and 
Category 1, the architecture corresponds to a 
single-channel and continuously monitored 
system. The test allows detecting a dangerous 
failure of a component. Thereby, the choice of the 
frequency of the test rate decreases the 
occurrence of dangerous failures. With the output 
of the test equipment, the hardware structure 
includes a supplementary shutdown path. 
Figure 4: Designated architecture for Category 2 
according to ISO 13849 [1] 
As shown in Figure 5, the architecture for 
Category 3 illustrates that the performance of the 
SF detects some single failures with a two-
channel structure (redundant), but not all failures. 
However, a loss of the SF can result from the 
accumulation of undetected failures. Category 4 
additionally uses extensive monitoring to limit 
undetected failures and hence the accumulation 
thereof. Here, the SFs always come into action 
when switching the machine on or during the 
working cycles, regardless of the accumulation of 
failures.  
Figure 5: Designated architecture for Category 3 and 
Category 4 according to ISO 13849 [1] 
2. FMEA GENERAL STRUCTURE 
The Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) 
and the German Association of the Automotive 
Industry (VDA) released the latest publication on 
FMEA in 2019 [6]. FMEA structures have been 
completely revised and expanded by adding a 
new method, the FMEA Supplement for 
Monitoring and System Responses
(FMEA - MSR) according to ISO 26262 [7]. The 
AIAG & VDA FMEA [6] standards are tailored 
to the automotive industry and thus, do not 
include a process of ISO 13849 [1] [2] for the 
required SFs in hydraulic control systems.  
This circumstance serves the following 
fundamental question: 
corresponding categories within the structure of 
the FMEA 
As guidance, this paper proposes several 
approaches how to perform an FMEA process for 
SFs in hydraulic control systems in practice. A 
function - as a non-safety-related function -
usually describes the intended purpose of an 
object or a system element. One or more 
functions can be assigned to each other 
respectively AIAG & VDA [6]. Unlike this 
definition, safety-related functions of a mobile 
machine, e.g. for a hydraulic loader crane, are 
higher-level functions, supplemented as an add-
on. These usually monitor the state of a functional 
system consisting of one to multiple inputs, one 
logic and several outputs. In the event of safety-
relevant failures, the system will switch off or fall 
back to a safe state to maintain required safety 
levels. 
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3. INTEGRATION OF SFS INTO THE FMEA 
PROCESS FOR HYDRAULIC CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
When preparing a system or sub-system FMEA, 
it is recommended to implement a P - Diagram. 
The P - Diagram is a graphical representation of 
the system structure and shows the relationship 
between systems parameters, system elements 
and their functions in form of a block diagram. 
They are determined and elementarily visualized. 
For the standard FMEA process, the P - Diagram 
is built around the object under consideration of 
the product, system, sub-system and single 
component according to the scope of the analysis. 
It shows the input signals, the output signals, the 
unintended outputs, the control factors and the 
confounders [8]. Figure 6 shows an example of a 
modified P - Diagram supplement including 
Failure Modes and the SFs.  
Figure 6: Proposed P  Diagram example, Quality in 
product development [8], with modified 
structure 
The P - Diagram is advantageous when analysing 
complex systems with various system 
interactions, operating conditions, design 
parameters and complex relationships of 
functions. The focus in the P - Diagram may be 
on the input and output variables or the respective 
functions for the system, the sub-system or the 
single-components. 
3.1. Theoretical models of a failure 
sequence chain 
The analysis of each FMEA generally consists of 
three various failure aspects: 
Failure Effects 
Failure Modes 
Failure Causes 
These three different aspects are linked together 
and show a failure sequence chain depending on 
the focus element. For connecting Failure Causes 
the  [6] and for linking Failure 
Effects with Failure Modes, the question is: 
 [6]. The standard failure sequence chain 
according to AIAG & VDA [6], as shown in 
Figure 6, does not comprise the SFs. The 
following four models of failure sequence chains 
represent different solutions including the 
integration of SFs.  
Figure 7: Standard model of a failure sequence chain 
according AIAG & VDA [6] 
For better clarification, the following solutions 
show practical examples, using the sub-system 
first boom of a loader crane, as shown in Figure 8 
and shown as a hydraulic circuit diagram in
Figure 9. According to the described process and 
the defined SFs, Category 2 PL d and 
Category 3 PL d are determined for the sub-
system first boom of a loader crane . 
In the case of the loader crane, the hydraulic 
pump is included in the scope of the truck 
hydraulics. The truck provides the required 
pressure supply and the corresponding flow rate 
via a specified hydraulic pump powered by the 
power take off (PTO) of the engine. 
Figure 8: Loader Crane, First Boom, 
DIN EN 12999:2013-02+A2:2012 [9] 
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Thus, the hydraulics of the loader crane are 
directly connected to those of the truck. 
The analysis of the hydraulic circuit diagram, 
Figure 9, shows all components that are essential 
for compliance with the SFs for the sub-system 
first boom.  
Figure 9: Hydraulic circuit diagram, First Boom, 
according to the IFA Report [10] 
The sensors pointed out in light grey trigger the 
SFs. The switching valves, shown in dark grey, 
act as actuator of the logic and monitor values 
marked in mid-grey to prevent the dangerous 
movement of the first boom cylinder. This 
depends on the failure modes of the sensors and 
their interfaces. In compliance with basic and 
proven safety principles, safety valves (pressure 
relief valve and counterbalance valve) support the 
cylinder function. All electrical components are
monitored by the Logic/PLC. According to the 
defined SFs and the corresponding 
Category 2 PL d the circuit implements two 
shutdown paths. Depending on the defined SFs, 
the first boom hydraulic also implements the 
Category 3 PL d with a two-channel structure. 
First method of safety-related solution: 
The first method of the safety-related solution of 
a failure sequence chain divides the Failure 
Modes into a safety-related part and non-safety 
related part. For all non-safety-related Failure 
Modes, the standard procedure of the FMEA 
process is applied according to 
AIAG & VDA [6]. If the Failure Modes are 
safety-related, further steps supplement the 
standard process see Figure 10. To achieve a 
better identification, a 
Failure Modes can disrupt safety 
goals/ , supplements the failure 
sequence chain. Furthermore, the SFs are defined 
as preventive measures for the respective failures. 
The corresponding Categories defined in 
ISO 13849 [1] for the individual SF specify the 
detection structures for the relevant SFs, see 
Chapter 1 Introduction. With the example of the 
respective SFs and their corresponding 
Category 2 PL d see Figure 10, the SFs will be 
defined as preventive measures to protect the 
system from damages. Additionally, the output of 
the test equipment is triggered by the safety 
detection measures; this reflects the two 
shutdown paths. 
Figure 10: Proposed safety-related solution I, 
according ISO 26262 [7], kVA by UL [11], 
with modified structure to ISO 13849 [1] 
The following example shows the conversion of 
the failure sequence chain into an FMEA 
structure, considering the SFs. This method of 
preliminary evaluation simplifies the system 
analysis and serves as a basis for the interface 
definition, and to generate the function and 
failure identification, see Figure 10. 
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Figure 11: Proposed structure analysis, safety-related 
solution I 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that the SFs are 
defined as safety reaction prevention measures. 
The task of these prevention measures is to bring 
the system to a safe state. The sensor signals of 
the respective components are monitored at start-
up and/-or during cyclical operation with the 
defined parameters for faulty signals outside the 
tolerance for value and time. The structure 
analysis also shows the two shutdown paths 
according to Category 2 PL d see Figure 11. 
Compared to the standard FMEA and their 
possibilities on how to integrate defined absolute 
characteristics into the FMEA structure, the SFs 
are implemented into the prevention action 
column of the form sheet, as shown in Figure 12. 
With this solution, it is not mandatory to build up 
the SFs with the corresponding Category 2 PL d 
in the function and failure networks. There is a 
possibility to integrate both FMEA processes 
(safety-related and non-safety-related) into one 
structure. Accordingly, the disadvantage is that 
the structure gets very complex.
Second method of safety-related solution: 
The second method of the safety-related solution 
of a failure sequence chain, see Figure 13, 
implements only SFs. Separately, a non-safety-
related solution can be designed. 
The standard model of a failure sequence chain  
was used as the basis. The difference to the 
standard model is that the Failure Causes are 
subdivided into three sections: 
Technical Failure Causes - Within the system 
Technical Failure Causes - Outside the system 
Failure Causes  Non-technical leads to 
Hazards 
Additionally, there are safety-related causes 
triggered by the user, which influence the SFs. 
The implementation of the Categorie 2 PL d and 
Category 3 PL d, according to ISO 13849 [1], 
shall be realized in this solution through the 
function and failure networks. 
Figure 13: Safety-related solution II, Schellbach [12]
The structure analysis for the second solution into 
an FMEA structure, as shown in Figure 14
Figure 12:  Proposed FMEA Form Sheet, First Boom Hydraulic, Loader Crane
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differs from the safety-related solution I. 
Depending on the level of the focus element, the 
failure detection, the safety for the user and the 
output of logic trigger the SFs. The prevention 
measures are designed as in the standard model 
in the context of development and planning. 
It is recommended to include the hardware 
structure for the SFs and the corresponding 
Category 2 PL d and Category 3 PL d into the 
failure and function network.  
Figure 14: Proposed structure analysis, safety-related 
solution II 
Third method of safety-related solution: 
In the third method, as shown in Figure 15, the 
standard model of the failure sequence chain 
forms the basis of the procedure. 
Figure 15: Proposed safety-related solution III, based 
on AIAG & VDA [6], with modified 
structure according to ISO 13849 [1] [2] 
Non-safety-related functions and safety-related 
functions can be integrated into this solution. The 
sensors as safety-related failure-causing 
components supply the input signals for the 
respective functions. The failure detection is 
controlled through the logic, and the output 
triggers the corresponding SFs directly. 
Therefore, in this solution, the SFs are an add-on 
to monitor the system elements. Depending on 
the SFs for Category 2 PL d and 
Category 3 PL , only the sensors or each 
system element influences the SFs and their 
failure possibilities respectively, which are 
applicable for the relevant system or sub-system. 
The following structure analysis, see 
Figure 16 illustrates an example of the defined 
hardware structure, Category 2 PL d for the first 
boom hydraulic  and corresponding SFs. The 
structure analysis in Figure 16 shows that the 
sensors trigger the SFs, the Logic/PLC controls 
the components, the test equipment monitors the 
sensors (how and how often), and the components 
which are responsible for the SFs. 
Figure 16: Proposed structure analysis, safety-related 
solution III 
With this representation of the sub-system first 
boom hydraulic , the associated functions and 
failure networks become very clear. Figure 17
shows a simplified example of a function network 
with the focus on the pressure sensor of the main 
block hydraulic supply , which triggers the SF 
Overturning Protection. The function network 
builds up the hardware structure of the 
Category 2 PL d with the two shutdown paths. 
The sensor signal (e.g. outside functional target) 
as the causes, the Logic/PLC as the controls of 
components, the test equipment as a diagnostic 
part, the valves as actuators and as an add-on, e.g. 
for the SF Overturning Protection. 
In the standard FMEA process each 
implemented sensor, every involved actuator and 
every SF in the complete loader crane system, 
must be connected into the function network with 
each other. The failure network is generated in 
the same way. In order to simplify the process 
structure, the function and failure networks can 
be created separately for each SF, which can then 
be linked together. 
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Fourth method of safety-related solution: 
The fourth safety-related solution also divides the 
Failure Modes into non-safety related and safety-
related Failure Modes. The difference to the other 
solutions is that all SFs and their corresponding 
categories are integrated into the failure sequence 
chain see Figure 18. The clear structure of the 
failure sequence chain thus simplifies the 
structure analysis and provides a good overview. 
Figure 18: Proposed safety-related solution IV, 
according ISO 26262 [7], with modified 
structure to ISO 13849 [1] [2] 
With this solution, the SFs are displayed directly 
with their associated category in the structure. 
The following example of a structure analysis see 
Figure 19 shows the Category 3 PL d for the SF 
Emergency Stop. For this SF and depending on 
the focus of the failure causes, all involved 
components which are responsible for the 
subsystem  the 
individual input. The SF as an add-on switches 
off the system depending on the output signals 
from the Logic/PLC. The structure analysis 
Figure 19 illustrates the redundant functionality 
of the Category 3 PL d. The specified parameters 
and requirements for the Category 3 PL d 
controlled by the Logic/PLC cut off the electrical 
supply if failures occur in channel 1 and 
channel 2 at the same time or when affecting the 
same function. 
Figure 19: Proposed structure analysis, safety-related 
solution IV 
When combined in one FMEA structure, the 
number of subsystems and the number of the 
defined SFs with different categories can easily 
make it very complex to build up a function and 
failure network including the non-safety-related 
functions, and the safety-related functions. 
Figure 20 shows the proposed function 
network as a simplified example for the SF 
Emergency Stop, for the pressure sensor 
ensor of the 
-
function network. Because all involved 
components on each sub-system influence the SF 
Emergency Stop, it is necessary to generate the 
function network for each component and for 
each sub-system, which triggers the SF. 
For clear structuring, it is recommended to 
first create the individual function and failure 
networks of the responsible components for the 
SF Emergency Stop and then to combine these 
individual networks accordingly. 
Figure 17: Proposed function network - Pressure sensor hydraulic supply - Overturning Protection
Category 2 PL d
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4. EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
Four possible methods answer the question: 
corresponding categories within the structure of 
Figure 21 compares the four different methods, 
starting with a combination of a safety-related 
solution and a non-safety-related solution with 
the emphasis on the safety-related perspective, 
but with a complex FMEA structure when 
combined. The first and the fourth solution 
illustrate that the SFs are realized as preventive 
and detection measures. The second solution only 
looks at the safety-related parts and the SFs are 
realized as detection measures. Therefore, it has 
a clear structure in the function and failure 
networks. In the third and the fourth method, the 
SFs are supplemented as an add-on. Systematic 
four shows a fully integrated approach with a 
clear overview of the defined categories for all 
involved SFs, see Figure 18, but also includes a 
complex FMEA structure. 
Figure 21: Comparison of the methods 
Figure 22 compares the advantages of the 
possible solutions based on the evaluation 
criteria. The practical implementation of the 
favoured third method can then be carried out as 
shown in for the example of the loader crane. 
Figure 22: Evaluation criteria for possible solutions
Figure 20: Proposed function network - Pressure sensor hydraulic supply - Emergency Stop Category 3 PL 
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5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
These methods not only apply to the one 
particular hydraulic mobile machine presented. 
Generally, they apply to all hydraulic mobile 
machines, which are a combination of a vehicle 
with a separate machine, such as loader cranes, 
fire trucks, truck-mounted concrete pumps or 
mobile cranes. The research using the loader 
crane example shows that separating the mobile 
machine and vehicle allows implementing the 
safety function and the corresponding categories 
into the FMEA structure.  
For other mobile working machines, e.g. 
graders, wheel loaders or wheeled excavators 
where separation is not possible and where street 
approval must also be taken into account, the 
entire process must be re-examined to show 
whether the proposed approach can be applied as 
well. Therefore, the following question arises 
again: 
How to integrate SFs, corresponding categories 
and street approval with their risks within the 
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